ABSTRACT. A model based on differences between workers regarding their preferences for wage and leisure drives the heterogeneity of firms result. The more industrious workers are driven to small firms due to free riding in large firms. An industry consisting of small and large firms turns out to produce more output than an industry consisting of only large firms. Some comparative statics results are derived with respect to the size of large firms, the productivity difference between firms, and monitoring capabilities.
I . I n t r o d u c t i o n
Casual empiricism indicates that large firms have difficulties organizing their research departments. The New York Times (1984) reported that "For the first time since the early days of the auto industry, the General Motors Corporation has bought a minority interest in a small company rather than swallowing it whole". The reasons given for GM's partial acquisition were:
--preserving incentives in the small high tech firm; --hiring difficulties of experienced people; --access to potential breakthroughs and guiding research.
A similar example is Westinghouse and its experience with the high tech firm Unimation. The Wall Street Journal (1984) reported about Westinghouse: "They learned that their financial incentives would be lower under Westinghouse and they felt the time it took to make business decisions would lengthen". Williamson (1985) has reported about similar cases and concludes that "large companies are becoming increasingly aware that the bureaucratic apparatus they use to manage mature products is less well-suited to supporting early stage entrepreneurial activity".
There are several interesting observations to be made with respect to the above phenomena. The first one concerns the employment of labour across firms. The question is whether or not the more productive workers are employed by large firms. The study by Garen (1985) predicts that individuals who acquire more schooling will be employed by larger firms and that larger firms will pay higher wages. Monitoring/evaluation costs rise with firm size in his model. Large firms rely in their wage compensation scheme therefore less on their own evaluation of workers than small firms do and more on other indicators such as schooling. Only workers with higher activity are willing to put forth the effort of getting a higher education in order to enter a large firm and obtain a higher wage. Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) derive a similar result for partnerships. Several studies support this relationship empirically (Brown et al., 1990) .
These analyses are not saying anything with respect to workers within a certain ability class (i.e., a certain level of schooling) due to unobservable characteristics of workers. Ability classes are usually broad and encompass many different characteristics. These differences within a certain class will influence the choice of a small or large firm by a particular worker. Our model addresses this question. It supports a claim by Stigler (1962) that: "Men should, in general, enter smaller companies, the greater their ability". The explanation in our model for the hypothesis of Stigler is that free riding in large firms drives the more industrious workers away from large firms, into small firms. They are employed by a less productive technology in order to prevent having free riding col-leagues. The hypotheses of Garen and Stigler therefore both hold because one has to distinguish between observable and non-observable characteristics of workers, given a certain level of schooling. Garen deals with observable characteristics whereas Stigler's hypothesis and our model are about unobservable characteristics.
A second observation is that neoclassical theory predicts that all firms are identical in long run equilibrium with perfect information and free entry. The inefficient firms are driven out of the industry when profits go to zero for the most efficient firms. However, empirical evidence suggests that small and large firms coexist in many industries. The large firms are usually considered more productive, ceteris paribus. If the larger firms are more productive in fact, then the existence of small firms remains a puzzle. Explanations have to deal somehow with the ceteris paribus condition regarding the internal functioning of firms.
Firms are viewed as entities employing workers in a production technique. The output of the firm is assumed to be divided between the workers of the firm. A firm in which the shares of all workers are the same is called a partnership (Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988) . Our reward schedule for workers in large firms corresponds to those of partnerships in section two, but workers differ with respect to their preference of providing effort. (Another difference is that incumbent workers can keep new workers out in the model of Farrell and Lander, whereas they cannot in our model.) Small firms employ only one worker in our set-up. The assumption of equal shares is relaxed in section three. The share in the output of the firm of a worker will be based upon a combination of equal share and an imperfect observation of the effort level provided. A group of people with possibly unequal shares is called a team (Farrell and Lander, 1989) . We continue to use the word firm for each production function, regardless of the number of workers employed and the renumeration scheme used.
We assume that the output of each firm depends on the effort level provided by the worker(s). The production of the large firm is influenced by two opposing forces. On the one hand, the technology of the large firm is more productive than those of small firms, ceteris paribus. This might induce workers to supply higher levels of effort. On the other hand, the individual effort levels cannot be costlessly observed by the firm. We assume that individual remunerations have to be based on joint performance, which creates a moral hazard problem. Workers may take advantage of this by supplying less effort. This moral hazard problem may be dealt with by hiring a monitor. However, there are problems associated with the use of a monitor, such as deciding which disciplinary powers are available to the monitor and the possibility that the monitor shirks. These considerations make us pursue a different approach.
One of the resons for the neo-classical result of identical firms in equilibrium is that labour is homogeneous. We will relax this assumption and employ a distribution of workers which will drive the heterogeneity of firms result. Workers are assumed to derive utility from wages and leisure. Some of them care mainly about wages, whereas others put more weight on leisure. Workers sort themselves across production techniques in order to maximize utility. This will result in an industry equilibrium consisting of small and large firms. Notice that the equilibrium size distribution of firms in this paper is not the result of a stochastic process, which underlies Gibrat's law (see, e.g., Simon and Bonini, 1958; Klepper and Graddy, 1990) , but is generated by an economic process (i.e., the sorting of workers across production techniques). The objective of this paper is not to derive Gibrat's law for certain types of industries, but to develop a model showing firm heterogeneity in equilibrium due to endogenous economic forces.
This article is organized as follows. Section two develops the model and delineates some of the forces at work by an example. Section three analyses monitoring. Finally, a summary and avenues for further research are provided.
II. The model

II.1. Firms
A firm is viewed as a production function employing a set of workers. The small firm is characterized by production technique f~(. ) and is able to employ only one worker. The large firm has
